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Article summary  
The challenge for a psychology of crowds and collective behaviour is to explain how large 
numbers of people are, spontaneously, able to act together in patterned and socially 
meaningful ways and, at the same time, how crowd events can bring about social and 
psychological change.  
Classical theories, which treat crowd psychology as pathological, deny any meaning to crowd 
action. More recent normative and rationalist models begin to explain the coherence of crowd 
action but are unable to explain how that links to broader social systems of meaning. In both 
cases, the explanatory impasse derives from an individualistic conception of selfhood which 
denies any social basis to behavioural control. Such a basis is provided by the social identity 
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approach. This proposes that crowd formation is underpinned by the development of shared 
social identity whereby people see themselves and others in terms of membership of a 
common category. This leads to three psychological transformations: members perceive the 
world in terms of collective values and belief systems; they coordinate themselves 
effectively; and hence they are empowered to realize their collective goals. This explains the 
social form of crowd action. At the same time crowd events are intergroup phenomena. It is 
through the intergroup dynamics between the crowd and an outgroup (typically the police) - 
more specifically the way the social position of crowd members can change through the 
police officers understand and respond to their actions - that change can occur. The social 
identity framework helps make sense of a range of phenomena beyond conflict crowds, 
including behaviour in emergencies and disasters and the psychology of mass gatherings. The 
practical adequacy of the social identity approach is demonstrated by its use in a number of 
applied fields, including ‘public order’ policing, crowd and emergency management, mass 
gatherings health, and pedestrian modelling.  
Keywords: crowd psychology, social identity, riot, mass emergency, mass panic, contagion, 
mass gathering, social influence, collective behaviour  
 
Introduction  
What is a crowd? Beginning with the earliest attempts to provide a scientific account of 
crowd psychology, scholars have distinguished between those ‘crowds’ that comprise simply 
individuals co-present in the same space and those psychological crowds that seems to share 
a purpose or a ‘mentality’. While psychological crowds are the main focus of crowd 
psychology theories, any such theory however also needs to say something about the relation 
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between these two, including how a physical crowd can become a psychological crowd (or 
vice versa). 
Like the term ‘crowd’, ‘collective behaviour’ has many referents across the social, 
behavioural and comparative sciences. We use it here to refer to those phenomena that are 
forms of psychological crowd, including but not exclusively protest crowds, riots, social 
movement manifestations, mass emergency behaviour, and the behaviour of crowds at sports, 
music, religious and ceremonial events.  
A useful definition, which captures the psychological problem that theory must address, 
is as follows: a crowd is a form of group in which people are interacting face-to-face but 
where there is no formal means for decision-making or direction (Reicher, 1984, p. 4). This 
definition therefore excludes the normal operation of armies and police forces (since these 
large groups have formal chains of command), dispersed groups (such as online 
communities, since they are not face-to-face), as well as most small groups (since by their 
small size they allow for collective decision-making). Yet clearly a theory able to explain 
collective behaviour in psychological crowds will also be able to explain many features of 
behaviour in armies, online communities, and small groups. 
This chapter begins by tracing the history of theories of crowd psychology, which for a 
number of years were preoccupied with crowd violence. We then outline the social identity 
approach to crowds, which provides a general framework for the psychology of collective 
behaviour. We show how the approach has provided novel insights into a range of forms of 
collective behaviour and crowd events, including mass emergencies, mass gatherings, and 
social influence between crowd events, and some of the psychological changes that occur 
beyond the events themselves. Finally, practical implications of the social identity approach 
are demonstrated by examples from applied fields, including ‘public order’ policing and 




A history of crowd psychology 
Classical crowd psychology from Taine to “de-individuation”  
Research has falsified most of the claims of the early theories of crowd psychology (Postmes 
& Spears, 1998; Reicher, 1987). However, it is important to consider them, for two reasons. 
First, these early approaches were extremely influential. Second, they echo many ‘common 
sense’ assumptions about crowds that have persisted in both popular and high culture for 
many years.  
The emergence of scientific crowd psychology in late nineteenth century France was 
prompted by ‘social problems’ in which the crowd was central (Van Ginneken, 1985). There 
had been revolutions in 1789, 1830, and 1848. Industrialization meant both ‘mass’ 
urbanization and strikes. From the perspective of the first crowd psychologists, the most 
shocking of all these events was the Paris Commune of 1871, in which workers in Paris 
violently rose up and constituted the city as an independent socialist republic (and were even 
more violently put down by troops).  
Horrified by the Commune, Hippolyte Taine began his monumental history of the 
decline of civilization in France. What was novel in Taine’s (1876) work was the use of 
concepts from psychology and medicine to analyse the “bestial” behaviour of the crowd 
(Stott & Drury, 2017). Subsequent crowd psychologists (most notably Fournial, Tarde and 
Sighele) developed these ideas, but only one of them achieved popular success: Gustave Le 
Bon. More than analysis of the supposed rise of mass irrationality, Le Bon (1895) presented 
his crowd psychology as a practical guide for combatting and harnessing the power of the 
crowd. He saw in the crowd a reversion to the most primordial state of a “race” or “people” 
(referred to as the “group mind”, or “racial unconscious” in modern commentaries). The 
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fundamental characteristic of the psychology of crowds is their stupidity, according to Le 
Bon; in crowds, even the most intelligent and civilized individuals regress to the stage of 
“barbarians”. This regression is said to occur through three psychological mechanisms: 
submergence (loss of personality through anonymity in the crowd), suggestibility (similar to 
a hypnotic state, and based on submergence), and contagion (uncritical social influence of 
any passing sentiment or behaviour, which is caused by suggestibility).  
In the first part of the twentieth century, the major challenge to Le Bon’s (1895) “group 
mind” approach was Floyd Allport’s (1924) behaviourist individualism. Allport argued that 
the individual should be the proper unit of analysis in the study of crowd psychology. The 
arbitrary violence of people when they were in crowds, Allport argued, reflected a 
combination of individual predispositions (both innate and learned) and simple stimulation of 
other co-present individuals, which causes “fundamental drives” (self-protection, hunger, 
sex) to overcome the civilized values that normally control behaviour.  
As well as sharing Le Bon’s assumption that the psychology of crowds is inherently 
primitive and instinctual, Allport’s approach also shared some essential problems with him. 
Both relied on fragmentary, selective, secondary examples, rather than systematic studies of 
crowd events. Le Bon, Allport and the others in the classical tradition described incidents of 
crowd violence shorn of their historical and intergroup contexts (Reicher, 1987). We know 
that the crowds Le Bon and Allport were referring to were revolutionary crowds or crowds 
involved in industrial disputes, and we know that where there was violence most of this was 
meted out by the forces of the state on the crowd, and that crowd violence – even the most 
brutal – was often in response to a long sequence of attacks (Barrows, 1981). But all this 
disappears in the accounts of the classical crowd psychologists, and crowd violence appears 
instead as a meaningless spasm. 
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After disappearing from the textbooks for several decades, classical crowd psychology 
flourished again from the late 1960s in the form of “de-individuation” theories. While “de-
individuation” retained key features of Le Bon’s framework – anonymity/submergence, loss 
of self, loss of behavioural control, reduction in critical judgement, and antisocial behaviour – 
the notion of a group mind was dropped (e.g., Zimbardo, 1970). The use of the laboratory 
experiment in “de-individuation” studies allowed for the systematic testing -- and ultimately 
clear debunking -- of some of the distinctive claims of classical crowd psychology. A 
comprehensive meta-analysis found little evidence that anti-normative behaviour was a 
generic effect of anonymity - rather the content of behaviour depended more on which 
identity and group norms were salient; and there was little evidence for loss of self as an 
underlying mechanism (Postmes & Spears, 1998). In conceptual replications of well-known 
“de-individuation” experiments, Reicher, Spears, and Postmes (1995) demonstrated that 
“immersion” in a group leads not to abandonment of norms but more conformity to those 
norms, particularly where the means of immersion itself (such as most of the manipulations 
used in “de-individuation” experiments) reduce cues for personal identity and instead make 
salient the group context. 
A basic limitation of all classical crowd psychology, from Taine to “de-individuation’, 
is that it does not have the concepts adequately to explain the fact that the vast majority of 
psychological crowds are not violent. Likewise, these approaches cannot explain patterns of 
behaviour in those crowds that are violent. A prediction easily derived from the classical 
tradition is that the violence of the crowd would be indiscriminate. Some of the best evidence 
against this claim came from historians. Thus E. P. Thompson’s (1971) study of the “moral 
economy” of the crowd in the eighteenth-century food riot showed that for all the hunger and 




While classical crowd psychology initially focused on crowd violence, it was also 
applied to another social problem -- that of collective behaviour in emergencies and disasters. 
The concept of ‘mass panic’ suggested that in such events the crowd is again a conduit of 
mindlessness and hence loss of behavioural control. In this view, the threat of danger causes 
an abandonment of existing bonds (Freud, 1921/ 1985) leading to both individual selfishness 
and self-defeating irrational behaviour, causing trampling, blocked doors and so on. In 
addition, such crowds are said to be liable to contagion, meaning that ‘panic’ reactions spread 
easily (e.g., Ross, 1908).  
As a claim about default collective behaviour in an emergency, the concept of mass 
panic first came under attack from disaster researchers in the 1950s (see Fritz, 1996, and 
Quarantelli, 2001), for three main reasons. First, the criteria for reasonable behaviour is often 
unclear in emergencies since there is usually limited information available to those affected 
(Sime, 1990). Second, numerous case studies (Sheppard et al. 2006) and reviews of the 
literature (Quarantelli, 2001) concluded that panic is “rare”. Third, while some emergencies 
are indeed characterised by individualistic behaviour (Chertkoff & Kushigian, 1999), most 
damning for the predictions of “panic” is the consistent evidence that social support and 
cooperation are remarkably common amongst those affected (Drury, 2018). 
Overall, then, classical explanations, which rely on concepts such as “loss of self” and 
“fundamental drives”, cannot explain meaningful crowd behaviour. They cannot easily 
explain cooperation or culturally defined limits to behaviour. Put differently, they cannot 
explain the social form of crowd behaviour -- why, for example, the food rioters targeted 
millers and merchants and the crowd in the French Revolution targeted the aristocrats. 
Similarly, concepts like “contagion” cannot explain limits to social influence - such as why 
the influence of the crowd demagogue does not extend to the riot police present in the same 
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crowd (Milgram & Toch, 1969). To explain all these features, different kinds of concepts 
were needed. 
 
Norms and rationality in theories of crowd behaviour  
R. H. Turner and Killian’s (1957) emergent norm theory (ENT) was an important attempt to 
break from the limitations of classical crowd psychology. In bringing the concept of social 
norms into the study of crowds, their work suggested that crowd behaviour was structured by 
shared understandings of appropriate conduct, specifying limits to behaviour. Thus, there was 
no “spiral of contagion” (R. H. Turner, 1964). Rather, borrowing from the work of Sherif 
(1936), they suggested that social influence was to an important degree a shared sense-
making process, that developed through interpersonal interaction in the form of milling, 
rumour, and ‘keynoting’ (defined as crystalizing the sentiment of the crowd). 
The use of the concept of social norm served to suggest that normal social life and 
crowd behaviour operated by the same processes. It is perhaps both a measure of the theory’s 
success that it has been applied to a wide variety of crowd events - and to disasters more than 
riots in recent decades (Lemonik, 2013). However, its distinctive claims were watered down 
as it attempted to accommodate criticisms (McPhail, 1991), such as evidence that the 
behaviours observed in many disasters are often based on existing social norms rather than 
“emergent” ones (Johnson, 1988). In addition, the idea of a long process of milling to 
develop a norm for the situation has been shown empirically to be unnecessary (Reicher, 
1984). 
A different criticism of emergent norm theory came from some social movement 
sociologists, who argued that the assumptions of “breakdown” implicit in Turner and 
Killian’s notions of the “extraordinary situation” and initial “normlessness” kept alive the 
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spirit of Le Bonian irrationalism. Thus Berk’s (1974) “gaming” approach agreed with 
emergent norm theory that collective behaviour was shaped by meanings which people 
shared in interpersonal interaction. It added that in crowd events individuals always act on the 
basis of cost-benefit calculations which take into account their existing “tastes” and 
individual interests. This would appear to account for patterns of targets in urban riots, such 
as white-owned and high-end stores (Berk & Aldrich, 1972). 
While rationalist approaches like game theory rightly criticize emergent norm theory 
for failing to expunge traces of classical crowd psychology, they have their own limitations. 
Classical crowd psychology presumes the individual self as the only self and as the sole basis 
for rational action, but the gaming approach makes the same assumption when it refers to 
“interests” and “tastes”. A key point here, then, is that different models of the crowd turn on 
different models of the self, and both gaming and emergent norm theory fail to properly 
theorise the self or identity. What was still needed was a theory of the “social individual”,  to 
explain why some behaviours (not others) become normative, and how interests can be 
collective -- or, put differently, a theory of the psychological mechanism through which the 
social can shape crowd action. That theory is described in the next section. 
The social identity approach to crowd psychology 
The concept of social identity 
The argument thus far can be simply summarised. The limitations of the approaches we have 
considered above turn on their individualistic conception of the self. The crowd setting is 
either seen as erasing the self (in which case behaviour becomes mindless and uncontrolled), 
as accentuating the self (in which case behaviour amplifies the idiosyncrasies of crowd 
members), or else as leaving the self untouched (in which case there is no distinctive crowd 
psychology). In all three cases, there is an inability to explain one of the core features of 
crowd action – what we call its spontaneous sociality. That is, as historical studies in 
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particular have revealed, the behaviour of crowd members has a socially meaningful pattern 
even in the absence of prior planning or formal leadership. To quote the historian William 
Reddy who studied riots in Rouen over a 100-year period: “the targets of these crowds thus 
glitter in the eye of history as signs of labourers’ conception of the nature of society” (1977, 
p. 84). What is more, as the great chronicler of the French Revolution, Georges Lefebvre 
suggests, this spontaneous sociality is something that is distinctive to the crowd. He argues: 
“in the mass, the individual, escaping the pressure of the small social groups which constitute 
the framework of everyday life, becomes much more sensitive to the ideas and emotions 
belonging to the larger collectivities of which he is also a part” (1954, p. 277). 
The challenge for psychology, then, is to explain this distinctive sensibility of crowds. 
How is it that we shift, not from mindful to mindless behaviour, but from behaviour based on 
individual or small group concerns to behaviour based on the perspective of large-scale 
collectivities such as nation or ‘race’ or class? This is precisely the issue addressed by the 
work of Henri Tajfel and John Turner on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and 
its subsequent development in Turner’s self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) – which, jointly, are termed the social identity approach (see 
Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010, for an overview). 
The starting point for the social identity approach lies in a radical shift in the way the 
self is conceptualised – from an entity to a system. That is, it is certainly true that there are 
times when we define our self in terms of what makes me, as an individual, distinct from 
other individuals. This is our personal identity. But equally, there will be times where we 
define our self in terms of our group memberships (‘I am British’, ‘I am a Catholic’, ‘I am a 
Conservative’) and what makes our group distinct from other groups. These are our social 
identities – and we generally have multiple social identities associated with the different 
groups to which we belong. While these social identities are deeply meaningful to us 
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personally (if not more so – after all, people may be prepared to die for their country in a way 
that would be unthinkable for their individual interests), the meanings associated with them 
cannot be reduced to the person but rather are defined historically and collectively. In this 
way, when social identity is salient, individuals come to act in terms of social values, norms 
and beliefs. 
More formally, then, the self-system is made up of relations between self and other 
defined at different levels of abstraction, the main ones being personal (‘I’ vs. ‘you’) and 
social (‘we’ vs. ‘they’). At different times and in different contexts, different parts of the self-
system will be psychologically salient and will shape behaviour. Early on, social identity 
theory, which focussed on the dynamics of intergroup behaviour, proposed that the shift from 
interpersonal to intergroup behaviour is underpinned by the shift from personal to social 
identity (Tajfel, 1978). Subsequently, self-categorisation theory, which sought to develop 
social identity concepts into a more general model of group process, proposed that social 
identity is the psychological construct that makes group behaviour possible (Turner, 1982, p. 
21).  
Equally, then, the starting point for social identity approaches to crowd psychology is 
the contention that selfhood is neither lost in the psychological crowd, nor is it simply 
accentuated. Rather, there is a shift in salience from personal identity to the relevant social 
identity. Indeed, one of the most constant findings of recent research is that, when referring to 
themselves, members of psychological crowds – whether demonstrators, protestors, sports 
fans, pilgrims or festival-goers – invoke their category membership rather than their 
individuality (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2019; Reicher, 1984; Neville & Reicher, 2011). 
Correspondingly, rather than understanding crowd psychology in terms of a simple binary of 
loss or else continuity of its psychological underpinnings, we need to address the various 
psychological transformations that occur when people shift from personal to social identity.  
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The three transformations of crowd psychology 
The first study of crowds from a social identity perspective was an analysis of the St Pauls 
Riot of April 1980 (Reicher, 1984). Similar to the historical studies described in the section 
on classical crowd psychology, this revealed a social pattern to the targets of crowd violence: 
the police, financial institutions and shops owned by outsiders were attacked, others were left 
alone or else, if targeted by individuals, were actively defended by crowd members. This 
pattern reflected the collective understandings of the St Pauls community who (even if not all 
Black) saw themselves in racialised terms as a group subjected to state repression and 
economic exploitation by external bodies.  
Drawing on the influence processes posited by self-categorisation theory (‘referent 
informational influence’ - see Turner et al., 1987), it was argued that once people defined 
themselves in terms of their St Pauls category membership, they sought to act in terms of the 
norms, values and beliefs associated with that category. Unlike everyday groups, however, 
the situation was unprecedented and there was no formal organization to guide the group. 
Therefore, there were no pre-existing guides as to exactly how to act. Hence, participants had 
to elaborate the implications of their broader category membership for how they should 
behave in the proximal situation, inferring this from the behaviours of other typical crowd 
members. Where someone threw a stone at the police this was seen to enact an anti-police 
norm and led to a hail of stones. However, when someone threw a stone at a bus, this was 
seen to be at odds with group norms and did not generalise – or even invoked active 
disapproval. In this way, the process of identity elaboration allowed for a changing spectrum 
of action, but always within clear collectively defined limits – and this then explained the 
socially intelligible pattern of crowd action. 
In this analysis, then, the emphasis is on the cognitive shifts that flow from a shift to 
social identification in the crowd. Instead of being controlled by individual understandings, 
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the behaviour of crowd members is controlled by social category-based understandings: we 
see the world, and what matters in the world, through a collective lens.  
Over time, however, analysis has both broadened our understanding of how cognition 
changes in the crowd and also pointed to additional shifts in social relations between people 
in crowd settings and in emotional experiences of crowd members. Together, these cognitive, 
relational and emotional changes constitute the three transformations of crowd psychology. 
Cognitive transformations 
By now, a large number of studies on a wide range of different types of crowd event have 
shown that the way we think about the world and the way we think about ourselves shifts in 
the crowd as social identities become salient. We define self and other not in terms of their 
individual characteristics but in terms of the groups they belong to and, accordingly, we 
stereotype both ingroup and outgroup members in terms of the characteristics we associate 
with these respective groups (Reicher & Stott, 2011; Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001; Stott & 
Reicher, 1998). Crowd members behave, not in terms of individual level understandings but 
in terms of group level understandings, thus placing normative limits on crowd action 
(Reicher, 1987; Stott, Drury & Reicher, 2017) – and, correspondingly, members are only 
influenced by messages that are consonant with group norms (Reicher, 1996). The interests 
we pursue in the crowd are not our individual interests but rather those of the group as a 
whole; hence an injury to a fellow group member is an insult to our (collective) self; and the 
success of the group is our own success, even if we individually suffer in achieving it (Stott 
& Drury, 2000). 
However, as a number of recent studies have emphasised, social identity is not only 
the basis of social perception. Rather it provides a framework through which we make sense 
of, and evaluate all experience, including basic somatic and sensory experiences (Hackel, 
Coppin, Wohl, & van Bavel, 2018; Reicher & Hopkins, 2016). Similarly, in crowd settings, 
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even our evaluations of basic physical conditions are transformed. Thus, in a series of studies 
of the Magh Mela, a huge annual Hindu festival in North India, Hopkins and colleagues have 
shown how physical experiences that would normally be experienced as unpleasant (such as 
extreme cold and loud noise) are evaluated more positively to the extent that they are seen as 
affirming pilgrim identity (Pandey, Stevenson, Shankar, Hopkins & Reicher, 2014; Shankar, 
Stevenson, Pandey, Tewari, Hopkins & Reicher, 2013). 
Relational transformations 
The second transformation that social identity processes bring about is a shift in social 
relations between crowd members towards greater intimacy. This is not simply a matter of 
social identification (‘I see myself as a member of this social category’) but of shared social 
identification (‘we see each other as members of this social category’) whereby people come 
to consider that members of the crowd think of themselves as constituting a common ‘we’ 
(Hopkins et al., 2019; Neville & Reicher, 2011). Or, to put it slightly differently, shared 
social identity involves crowd members ceasing to think of their fellows as ‘other’ but rather 
as part of a common extended self. In this situation, what happens to other members happens 
to one’s (social) self. Their fate is my fate. Moreover, there is also an assumption that others 
will likewise respond to my fate as if it were their fate. 
In the general group literature, there is a growing body of work showing the 
consequence of such a sense of ‘we-ness’ on social relations. It leads to a sense of trust and 
respect between people (Tyler & Blader, 2001), to greater mutual support and helping 
(Levine, Evans, Prosser & Reicher, 2005), and to reduction of disgust at sensual contact with 
them (Reicher, Templeton, Neville, Ferrari & Drury, 2016). In crowds, in contrast to the 
assumption that density is always aversive and that spatial needs always personal (Sommer, 
1969), a sense of we-ness leads to greater tolerance for physical proximity to others (Novelli, 
Drury & Reicher, 2010) and enjoyment of being in the most dense locations (Novelli, Drury, 
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Reicher, & Stott, 2013). The culmination of all this is that shared social identity enables 
group members better to coordinate, cooperate and co-act with each other. They become a 
more coherent and potent unit. 
Evidence for such cooperation and coordination was apparent from some of the first 
social identity analyses of crowd events. For instance, Reicher (1996) shows how strangers in 
a student protest would intervene to stop others getting arrested by the police even at the risk 
of being arrested themselves. But only more recently have such phenomena become a focus 
of crowd research – and in two areas in particular. One is the study of collective behaviour in 
emergencies and disasters, and the other is the study of mass gatherings. 
Relational transformations in emergencies and disasters  
As we have seen, a fatal flaw of ‘mass panic’ as an explanation of default behaviour in 
emergencies and disasters is the consistent evidence of social support and cooperation 
amongst survivors. Three kinds of explanations have been offered for this evidence. First, 
normative explanations suggest that people continue to conform to the same rules, roles and 
schemas that shape their behaviour in everyday life (e.g., Donald & Canter, 1992; Johnson, 
1988). However, people have many different norms they might conform to, and without 
further psychological specification, a social norm explanation merely re-describes behaviour.  
A second explanation is in terms of existing relationships, reflecting the extensive 
evidence that people orient first to family members and friends in emergencies (Mawson, 
2007). However, this explanation is also insufficient given the evidence of widespread 
solidarity with strangers, even in the presence of threat and in the absence of attachment 
figures (e.g., Bartolucci & Magni, 2017). 
 A third explanation focuses on the emergent groups that arise from perceptions of 
common fate (Fritz, 1996) and suggests that shared social identity among survivors is the 
crucial mediating mechanism between such perceptions of common fate and cooperative 
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behaviour in emergencies (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009ab). Sometimes existing group 
boundaries are dissolved in such events (Fritz, 1996). But at other times there are no salient 
group memberships immediately prior to the emergency. This was evident in a study of the 
July 7th 2005 London bombings, in which the survivors were commuters who described a 
lack of connection with those around them in normal circumstances but a new sense of 
togetherness immediately following the explosion, leading some of them to take personal 
risks to help strangers (Drury et al., 2009b).  
In emergencies and disasters, people not only give support but also perceive and 
expect it (Kaniasty, 2019), enabling anticipation of others’ actions and hence facilitating 
coordination. A survey of survivors of an earthquake and tsunami in Chile in 2010 found that 
common fate predicted social identification with others affected by the disaster which in turn 
predicted both giving emotional social support and (indirectly, through expected support) 
participation in coordinated support activities for the whole community (Drury, Brown, 
González, & Miranda, 2016).   
The evidence from emergencies and disasters therefore turns early crowd theory on its 
head. Rather than the stress of emergencies reducing sociality and increasing danger, in many 
emergencies there is an emergent shared social identity which is the basis of mutual support 
and hence collective resilience (Drury, 2018). 
Relational transformations in mass gatherings.  
Considering mass gatherings, especially religious mass gatherings, we also see the emergence 
of a sense of ‘we-ness’ amongst pilgrims. This again leads to multiple forms of cooperation 
and support amongst crowd members – albeit that the forms of cooperation that are 
appropriate in a religious festival are very different from those necessary in a disaster. Thus, 
in a study of the Magh Mela, it was found that people sometimes show active forms of 
cooperation by commission (such as physically supporting the elderly during rituals of 
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bathing in the Ganges) but also by omission (avoiding gossip and giving others space to 
pursue their spiritual activities). Similar intimacies are found in studies of the Hajj (the 
pilgrimage to Mecca) (Alnabulsi, Drury, & Templeton, 2018). Moreover Alnabulsi and Drury 
(2014) found that, to the extent that people identified with the rest of the crowd they were 
more comfortable in dense physical proximity to others which they saw as providing them 
with support in a potentially dangerously crowded situation. 
Emotional transformations 
Thus far we have seen how social identity provides crowd members with a common 
understanding of their social world and a common sense of their interests in this world. We 
have also seen how shared identity allows crowd members to act together more effectively in 
the pursuit of these interests. That is, in the crowd people shift from acting individually for 
different ends to acting together for the same end. This makes them far more able to 
overcome obstacles that stand in the way of them achieving these ends. Indeed, one of the 
most striking features of crowd events is the sense of empowerment amongst participants as 
they develop a sense of shared identity and begin to become aligned psychologically and 
behaviourally. Thus, Drury and Reicher (1999) describe a demonstration in which an initially 
disparate set of protestors come to see themselves as a single group and thereby feel better 
able to break through a police cordon and reach their goal of entering a Council meeting and 
registering their dissent. 
Such empowerment, then, increases the ability of crowd members to enact their social 
identity and to shape the world according to their own collective vision. To build on Lefebvre 
(1954), cited above, it is not just that we act as a social subject in the crowd, the crowd is one 
of the few places where we feel and are able to make our own world. Most of the time, we 
live in a world and according to rules made by others. In crowds, we are better able to make 
our own rules and others must dance to our tune (Reicher, 2015). 
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We have variously called this phenomenon of social identity enactment ‘collective 
self-realisation’ (CSR: Khan, Hopkins, Reicher, Tewari, Srinivasan & Stevenson, 201); 
Reicher & Haslam, 2006) and ‘collective self-objectification’ (CSO: Drury & Reicher, 2005, 
2009). It has important conceptual ramifications. For the root of anti-collectivistic and anti-
crowd sentiment is the notion that people lose agency and subjecthood in the mass, becoming 
more like automata than persons. The evidence suggests the precise opposite. It is perhaps 
only in the crowd that most people are agentic, that they can act on their own terms and make 
their own history, that they cease to be objects of others control, and that they achieve full 
subjecthood.1 
And for this reason, CSO/CSR is experienced as intensely positive. Many researchers 
have noted positive sentiment as a key characteristic of crowds (e.g., Páez, Rimé, Basabe, 
Wlodarczyk, & Zumeta, 2015; Sullivan, 2018). Durkheim (1912/1995) captured this 
bubbling excitement in the term ‘effervescence’.  
Traditionally – in psychology at least – such strong emotion has been taken as 
evidence for the loss of rational thought. Studies in very different types of crowds suggest, 
however, that there are three main reasons why crowds are associated with strong positive 
emotions. First, the presence of others serves to validate the emotions expressed, enhancing 
their intensity (Neville & Reicher, 2011; Hopkins et al., 2019). Second, because others are 
understood as an extension of self in such events, they are perceived to provide support for 
one’s needs as a category member (Hopkins et al., 2016). And third for those crowds that act 
to change features of their world in line with their social identity there is the exhilaration that 
comes from empowerment, or CSO/CSR. Hopkins et al. (2016) for instance, show intense 
                                                     
1 Philosophically speaking, the ‘subjecthood’ of the ‘self-realizing’ religious devotee is in fact subsumed within 
that of God, which is not the case for the action of the group involved in social change, whose collective action 
negates a relationship of alienation (see Drury, Evripidou, & Van Zomeren, 2015). 
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positivity amongst pilgrims at the Magh Mela flows in part from the sense of intimacy with 
their fellows and from the ability to overcome the constraints of everyday life and full devote 
oneself to the spiritual. Stott and colleagues (Reicher & Stott, 2011; Stott et al., 2017), detail 
a similar joy amongst urban rioters which flows from a reversal of everyday social relations 
where they feel controlled by the police to one in which the rioters control events and force 
the police to be responsive to them. 
Processes of change 
So far, we have taken social identification along with shared social identity as givens and 
examined the consequences principally for intra-crowd processes: collective understanding, 
social relations amongst crowd members, and collective experience. In so doing, we have 
sought to explain how the shape of crowd action is socially determined. However, it isn’t just 
that crowds bring people together to express pre-defined social identities. As was evident 
even in the initial social identity study of the St Pauls riot (Reicher, 1984), social identity, the 
relations between people, and the ways that they act can all be changed in the course of 
crowd events. The day after the riot, St Pauls residents defined their group as far more 
confident and worthy of respect, and felt far more able to defy the police. Crowds, then, are 
characterised not just by social determination but also by psychological change. An adequate 
psychology of crowds must therefore address processes of change. We address these on three 
levels: change within events, spread and change between events, and change beyond the 
crowd itself. 
Change in events - The Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowds (ESIM) 
In order to complement the study of social determination in crowds with an analysis of 
psychological change, it is necessary to complement the analysis of intra-group processes 
with an analysis of intergroup processes. For crowd events do not just involve the crowd, 
they characteristically involve other groups, notably the police. One cannot understand how 
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events unfold, then, by limiting the analytic gaze to just one of these parties. One must 
examine the nature of the interactions between the two. And indeed, ESIM developed from 
the observation of a particular pattern of interaction which was associated with the emergence 
of generalised conflict in crowds that were initially opposed to violence. 
This pattern, first described in a student demonstration (Reicher, 1996), was 
subsequently seen in a number of different collective events, from football matches (Stott & 
Reicher, 1998) to tax protests (Stott & Drury, 2000), to anti-roads campaigns (Drury & 
Reicher, 2000) to urban riots (Stott et al., 2017). It involved the following stages: 
1. A heterogenous crowd gathers, made up of multiple groups, the majority non-
confrontational, a minority confrontational 
2. The police perceive the crowd as constituting a homogeneous threat and hence respond 
with actions designed to prevent all crowd members from pursuing their goals (e.g. by 
setting up cordons; by surrounding and containing the crowd; by charging and dispersing 
the crowd) 
3. A shared sense of identity and of unity emerges amongst the crowd, centred on the 
perceived illegitimacy of the police outgroup. Such unity produces a sense of 
empowerment and leads crowd members to challenge the police. 
4. The response of the crowd serves to confirm initial police perceptions of crowd danger 
and leads them to escalate their repressive measures. This leads in turn to an increasingly 
unified crowd challenge and to an escalating spiral of conflict. 
Consequent upon this pattern of interaction, are a number of psychological changes, 
most comprehensively documented in Drury’s series of studies of a campaign against the 
building of the M11 link road through East London (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005; Drury, 
Reicher & Stott, 2003) During this campaign, the local protesters changed their identity, 
coming to see themselves as radical and oppositional. They changed their understanding of 
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the social world and of specific groups such as the police, going from a ‘consensus’ view in 
which the authorities neutrally manage society to a ‘conflict’ view in which different groups 
have fundamentally opposed interests and the authorities serve the interests of the powerful. 
They also changed their views of other groups across time and space – including not only 
other anti-roads protesters across the country, but also the Ogoni tribe fighting Shell in 
Nigeria, and striking miners fighting the government in the 1980 – coming to see them as part 
of a common category of those fighting against injustice, and subject to the same police 
repression as themselves. They also changed their views concerning the purpose of their 
campaign, from a narrow defence of their neighbourhood to broad opposition to the 
government road-building programme and indeed to attacks on the environment. Finally, they 
changed their criteria for evaluating the success of the campaign, from stopping the link road 
being built through their neighbourhood to standing up to the police and roadbuilders and 
exposing their illegitimacy to the wider public. 
In order to explain how intergroup dynamics produce such thoroughgoing changes, 
ESIM interrogates the very nature of social identity. This is conceptualised as a 
representation of self in social relations (see Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017). Thus, for instance, 
to define oneself as American is to conceptualise the world as organised in terms of national 
categories along with the way in which the US relates to other nation states. It follows that 
any change in one’s social relations to others opens the way to a change in social identity. In 
interactive contexts, this can happen not only through one’s own actions, but also through the 
way in which outgroups understand and respond to one’s actions.  
Thus, in crowds, where members act on one understanding of their social position 
(‘we are respectable demonstrators exerting our democratic rights’) but these actions lead to a 
different understanding by an outgroup such as the police (‘they are a dangerous crowd who 
constitute a threat to the social order’) and where moreover that outgroup has the ability to 
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impose their understanding on the crowd (by deploying their resources to contain or disperse 
the crowd) – if, in other words, the police have the power to reposition crowd members – 
then the conditions of identity change are produced. 
To put the argument more simply, where crowd members see themselves as 
‘respectable’ but are treated by the police as oppositional then they will begin to see 
themselves as oppositional. They will become more sympathetic to those radical voices in the 
crowd which characterise the police as an opposition. Moreover, to the extent that the actions 
imposed by the police are seen as illegitimate this legitimizes resistance to them (which may 
include violent conflict); and to the extent such police actions are seen as indiscriminate they 
create a sense of common fate and hence unify a previous disparate crowd; in which cases 
people will feel both more willing and more empowered to express their oppositionalism in 
action (Drury et al., 2015; Drury & Reicher, 2009).  
It is clear from this, that, for crowd members, reconstruing their own identity is bound 
up with reconstruing the identity of the police. It is also clear that change in identity is bound 
up with a changing worldview, in this case towards a world rooted in social antagonisms. 
Thus, others standing in opposition to the police will become part of an extended ingroup. 
And success in such an antagonistic world starts with confronting the power of the 
authorities. If identity is bound up with a broader understanding of social relations, this 
explains why the processes which bring about identity change will also bring about a series of 
changes in one’s understanding of how one relates to others and how one should act in the 
world. 
There is one final point that needs to be stressed. Although, to date, the emphasis in 
empirical studies has been about changes towards radicalism and escalation of conflict in 
crowd events, ESIM is not simply a model of radicalisation and nor is it simply a model of 
change. On the one hand, then, if crowd members see themselves as in opposition to the 
24 
 
police but are repositioned as ‘respectable’, then one would expect deradicalization of 
identity. This is precisely what Stott has found in his studies of football crowds, where the 
police altered their focus towards respecting fans and facilitating their collective goals. In 
such contexts, fans reconstrue the police as allies, reject confrontation, and indeed 
collectively self-regulate in cases where individuals act in confrontational ways (Stott, 
Adang, Livingstone & Schreiber, 2008). 
On the other hand, ESIM dynamics require a number of conditions for the production 
of change. These include (a) an asymmetry of perception in the way crowd members see 
themselves and the way they are perceived by the police; (b) the use of police power to 
constrain the crowd; (c) sufficient empowerment in the crowd to challenge police constraint. 
These conditions are relatively rare. In most cases the police will see crowds as crowd 
members see themselves and their actions will confirm the ways crowd members understand 
themselves and their world. Even if they don’t, the police won’t often consider it necessary to 
act against the crowd (say, when there are no sensitive targets nearby). And even if they do 
act against the crowd, crowd members won’t often feel able to challenge them (say, where 
their numbers are too low; Drury & Reicher, 2005). In other words, ESIM may well specify 
when change occurs, but equally it explains when (and why) it does not. 
Change between events 
Most research on crowds has been restricted to the study of single events or else, as in the No 
M11 Link Road campaign we have just been discussing, to multiple events involving the 
same pool of people. However, often, crowd events come in waves involving entirely 
different participants. This is particularly true of urban riots, whether in the US in the 1960s 
(National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968), the UK in the 1980s 
(Waddington, Jones and Critcher, 1989) or, more recently, the UK riots of 2011 (Reicher & 
Stott, 2011). In each case, an initial riot quickly led to riots elsewhere across the whole 
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country. Indeed, the intensity of previous riots is among the most important predictors of 
when and where further riots occur, over and above other important factors such as 
deprivation (Myers, 2010). How, then do we explain the nature of this spread? 
Both descriptively and in explanations of the spread of riots, one concept has 
dominated: contagion, the notion that psychological states are transmitted automatically 
between people like a disease, a concept that goes back as far as the works of Espinas on 
sociality in animals (Barrows, 1981). Writing of the 2011 riots, Slutkin (2011) suggests: 
“That violence is an epidemic is not a metaphor; it is a scientific fact… Once the event is 
triggered, it moves from person to person, block to block, town to town. This pattern is not 
unique to London: it is evident in past riots throughout the US, from Cincinnati to Crown 
Heights in New York to the Los Angeles riots ignited by the Rodney King beating.”  
However, there are two major problems with such an argument. On the one hand, it 
does not explain why different places, though equally exposed to an earlier riot, respond in 
different ways. In some places people do riot, in other places they do not, in yet others they 
turn out to prevent riot or else to clean up the damage that previously occurred. On the other 
hand, it does not explain the differing nature of the riots in different places. As has been 
noted, for instance, the initial riot of 2011, in Tottenham, North London, was principally an 
anti-police event. That was also true of some of the ensuing riots, but others were more 
centred on looting (commodity riots) and yet others were aimed at symbols of wealth and 
privilege (class riots) (Ball & Drury, 2012).  
Today, many sociologists and criminologists reject the irrationalist associations of the 
term ‘contagion’, redefining it as rational choice based on individual participants’ judgement 
and communication (e.g., Myers, 2010). In a similar way to the "contagion" concept, 
however, rational choice and communication require more social psychological specification 
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to explain both why people in some locations and not others join in with rioting and why 
some people are more influential than others. 
From a social identity perspective, influence and the process of spread is neither 
automatic nor indiscriminate. Mere exposure to others rioting is not enough to make others 
more likely to react themselves. Rather one must look at the categorical relations between 
those involved in earlier riots and those who observe them. However, that covers both the 
relationship of observers to the rioters and to the authorities. What is more, the observers can 
be either local community members in different places or else the authorities. Taking these 
distinctions into account suggests a number of processes of spread. 
Starting with community members as observers, a first process is based on common 
identification with those rioting elsewhere. The Tottenham riot was very much centred on a 
shared understanding of racist policing, having developed from a police shooting of a local 
young Black man (Stott et al., 2017). A common identification as both anti-police and linked 
to Tottenham was especially apparent in Brixton, another relatively Black area of London. 
The fact that Brixton residents saw themselves in the Tottenham rioters and that these latter 
provided a normative frame for their own action was critical to the onset and development of 
the riot in this locality (Drury et al., 2020). 
The second process involves observers who don’t necessarily perceive the rioters as 
part of a common ingroup but who do see the police as a common outgroup and, who, in 
witnessing the vulnerability of the police, feel empowered to act in ways that would normally 
be prevented by police action. This was the case in Croydon and Clapham, other districts in 
South London, where rioters expressed less shared identification with the Tottenham rioters 
than was the case for Brixton participants, but who felt able to defy the police. However, the 
police themselves were often not their primary target. Rather, they defied the police in order 
to loot and attack property. In this way, as the riots came to involve different groups with 
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different collective grievances, it did not just spread but also change its character (Drury et 
al., 2020). 
Finally, shifting from the community to the police as observers, previous riots can 
make officers more sensitive to the possibility of further disturbances and more concerned 
with the consequences (in the aftermath of the Tottenham riot, the police came under 
sustained political attack from the government for failing to intervene quickly or strongly 
enough).2 Such circumstances will make the police alter their criteria for intervention and 
make them more likely to intervene earlier and more force even under conditions of limited 
threat (Cronin & Reicher, 2009). Moreover, following the dynamics of ESIM described 
above, such intervention may produce a sense of police illegitimacy and collective 
empowerment amongst crowd members, leading to an escalation of violence which might not 
otherwise occur. An example of these dynamics comes from Salford, where strong police 
action against a relatively minor incident drew in more crowd members and led to a 
significant conflict (Drury et al., forthcoming). 
Change beyond events 
Until very recently, the study of crowd dynamics has been restricted to what happens in 
crowds. But a number of studies have begun to ask the question ‘does what happens in the 
crowd stay in the crowd?’. If not, in what ways and through what processes do crowd events 
have impacts beyond the crowd? These questions are of considerable significance because 
they speak to the overall importance of crowds and crowd studies (Reicher, 2017). Are crowd 
events relatively rare and exceptional phenomena that tell us little about everyday psychology 
and society, and hence can never be more than a niche interest? Or do they play an important 
                                                     




role in shaping everyday psychology and society, in which case crowd analysis acquires 
much greater significance? 
Returning to the topic of mass pilgrimages, it is known that attendance at these events 
can change attitudes and identities for some time afterwards (e.g. Clingingsmith, Khwajam, 
& Kremer, 2009). Recent research has evidenced the social identity basis of such changes. 
Khan et al.’s (2016) longitudinal study of the Magh Mela found that pilgrims’ shared social 
identity with the crowd predicted increased social identification as a Hindu. Alnabulsi, Drury, 
Vignoles, and Oogink (2019) found evidence of more positive attitudes among Hajj pilgrims 
towards non-Muslims as well as other Muslim groups. Less expectedly perhaps, attendance at 
the Mela has been found to increase both physical and mental well-being (Tewari, Khan, 
Hopkins, Srinivasan & Reicher, 2012).  
When it came to how these changes were brought about, overlapping but distinct 
processes were involved. Thus, in the case of enhanced identification, the critical precursor 
was the sense of collective self-objectification/realisation, itself contingent on shared social 
identity amongst crowd members (Khan et al., 2016). That is, insofar as social identity is 
understood as a representation of how the world is, or should be, then experiencing the reality 
of such a world makes the identity more viable and meaningful to people. For changed 
attitudes to other groups, contact and shared identity with the crowd were the crucial factors 
(Alnabulsi et al., 2019). In the case of well-being, the critical precursor was ‘relationality’ – 
the shift towards intimate and supportive social relations amongst crowd members, though 
this too was contingent on social identification and shared social identity. More specifically, 
such relationality provided people with a sense that they would be supported by other group 
members. And if those group members were present when they returned home, they felt 
better able to deal with the challenges posed by everyday life, hence impacting their physical 
and their mental well-being (Khan, Hopkins, Reicher, Tewari, Srinivasan & Stevenson, 
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2015). In the case of protest crowds, the changes in identity towards a ‘radicalized’ self 
(Drury & Reicher, 2000), and the behavioural consequences of this (including lifestyle 
changes in terms of diet, friendship groups, and consumption), have been shown to be 
sustained similarly by relational factors such as perceived social support in the campaign 
ingroup (Vestergren, Drury & Chiriac, 2018). 
There is, however, one serious limitation to all this work on change beyond events. 
That is, if the impact of crowd events on everyday life applies only to the actual participants, 
then this impact will always be severely limited for even the largest events only involve a 
small proportion of the members of the society as a whole. Critically, then, we need to 
address whether crowd events impact non-participants as well as participants. Drawing on 
Anderson’s (1983) work which analyses the nation as an ‘imagined community’, Reicher 
(2017) proposes a possible mechanism. That is, Anderson argues that we can never assemble 
the entire nation in one place and observe it directly. Rather we have to imagine ourselves as 
a nation and also imagine what our nationhood means. So how do we do that? To the extent 
that a crowd is representative of the broader category, it becomes the imagined community 
made manifest. Through observing a national crowd, we can see ourselves mirrored and 
observe who we are and where we stand in the world. This is true not only of nationhood, but 
also of other broad social categories – our gender, our religion and so on. 
There is some evidence to support this view. For instance, Lowery (2016) shows how 
crowd events following the killing of Black men in Ferguson and elsewhere played an 
important role in redefining how Black people saw themselves in the US and how they 
conceptualised their relation to the police and place in US society. There is also more 
systematic evidence to show how observing protest crowds can affect the extent to which 
people support their demands and construe the stability of society (Jimenez-Moya, Miranda, 
Drury, Saavedra & Gonzalez, 2019). Clearly, though, this is just a starting point. Crowds are 
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clearly a significant factor in shaping and reshaping individuals and societies. But exactly 
how widespread these changes are remains to be investigated. 
Extensions and applications    
Theories of crowd psychology have often been applied to practical social problems. In this 
section, we summarize established impacts of the social identity approach to crowds in two 
areas where crowd psychology has previously had a malign and dangerous influence – 
‘public order’ policing and emergency and crowd safety management. We also indicate the 
promise of the social identity approach in two further areas – computer simulation of 
pedestrian movement and mass gatherings medicine.  
‘Public order’ policing  
Police methods of crowd control, based on assumptions that crowds are mindless and liable 
to violence, reflect the long-standing anti-crowd discourse going back many years (e.g., 
McClelland, 1989). In addition, rationales for certain police practices have sometimes been 
explicitly derived from the work of Le Bon and others in classical crowd psychology 
(Waddington & King, 2005; see Reicher et al., 2007). These practices include mounted 
charges and other forms of coercion against the whole crowd. ESIM research has 
demonstrated that these constitute the perceived illegitimate and indiscriminate police actions 
that lead to the escalation of conflict in many cases (Stott, 2009).  
However, while UK and European police forces had been aware of the ESIM research 
since the early 2000s, it wasn’t until UK police were faced by a highly damaging crisis of 
public order policing, when a member of the public was killed, that the assumptions of 
classical crowd psychology were removed from the official guidance and training materials 
(Hoggett & Stott, 2012). In its place were recommendations derived from the ESIM that, 
instead, would minimise the potential for collective conflict. This included the principles of 
education (i.e. know your crowd’s identity and norms), facilitation (support the crowd’s 
31 
 
legitimate aims), communication (talk to people in the crowd), and differentiation (avoid 
methods that are indiscriminate) (Reicher et al., 2007). Among the changes that have 
subsequently been implemented are the introduction of protest liaison officers who use 
dialogue-police techniques to build rapport with protesters (Stott Scothern & Gorringe, 
2013). There have been parallel developments in the context of policing football crowds, 
where for example the efficiencies of the new form of policing (reducing conflict and arrest) 
have saved thousands of pounds in police overtime (Stott, West, & Radburn, 2018).  
It is fair to say that that the application of principles derived from ESIM to public order 
policing have been controversial at times. Some police are critical, arguing that the ESIM 
underestimates the potential for crowd violence and the need for coercion as a principal tool. 
Others argue that the “dialogue” approach amounts to a more subtle form of coercion (see 
Stott et al. 2013), and that it excludes those forms of protest (such as disruption and violence) 
that may be necessary to bring about social change.3   From the 2010s onwards, principles 
based on ESIM were written into key official public-order guidance manuals and College of 
Policing training modules. The effects on policing represent perhaps one of the biggest 
impacts social psychology has had on policy and practice in the last 20 years.  
Crowd safety and emergency management 
In the field of emergency management, practices based on assumptions of ‘mass panic’ 
prevailed for a number of years. Yet critics argue that such practices can create the very 
psychological vulnerability they are intended to mitigate. For example, the imperative “don't 
tell them—they'll only panic” leads response agencies to restrict information, and a perceived 
                                                     
3 While these criticisms of protest liaison police focus on the intended functions of dialogue policing, others 
focus on their use by police for more traditional goals (e.g., Out of the Woods, 2019) 
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lack of information increases public anxiety and distress and reduces efficacy (Drury et al., 
2019). 
The research on emergent social identity in crowds in emergencies (Drury et al. 
2009ab) is consistent with some of the principles of the community resilience programmes 
that developed after 9/11 – in particular the notion that crowds of strangers are capable of 
forming bonds in emergencies, which allow them to respond in an adaptive way (i.e. 
evacuate, coordinate, care for each other), independent of the emergency services. The social 
identity approach has therefore provided the rationale for interventions designed to support 
and build upon survivors’ collective psychological capacities in these events, rather than 
substitute for them. These interventions include prioritising communication to give survivors 
the efficacy to deal with the situations they face. In numerous official guidance documents 
and training programmes on crowd safety management at sports and live events worldwide, 
assumptions of ‘mass panic’ have been replaced by references to social identity, group 
norms, and communication (Drury et al., 2019).  
Perhaps the most concrete example of the social identity approach transforming 
practices in emergency response is the case of mass casualty decontamination in the event of 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents (Carter, Drury, Rubin, 
Williams, & Amlôt, 2015; see Drury et al., 2019). As the decontamination procedure 
involves removing clothes, the public can experience it as more threatening than the CBRN 
incident itself. Previous guidance had either neglected psychology or referred to ‘mass panic’ 
and ‘disorder’. The result has been poor public compliance with the decontamination 
procedure, increasing contamination risk both for those affected and for the wider public. 
Standard training for UK Fire and Rescue Service personnel has now changed to foreground 
communication techniques that convey legitimacy (i.e., being treated fairly and reasonably in 
the decontamination process) and which thereby build shared social identity between 
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responders and members of the public. Such shared social identity reduces anxiety and 
increases cooperation and compliance with the procedure.  
Computer simulation of pedestrian movement 
Computer models of pedestrian flow are have become a standard tool in planning for events, 
buildings, and transport hubs. However, until recently modellers’ assumptions about the 
psychology of crowds has lagged behind what is known in social psychology (Sime, 1985). 
Simulations often treat crowds as consisting of either an aggregate mass where every person 
is allocated identical properties and goals, or as individuals with different individual qualities. 
Other types of simulation acknowledge the fact that group psychological bonds exist between 
people in crowds but conceptualize the group only as a small group of individuals, without 
any capacity for identification with the rest of the crowd (see Templeton, Drury, & 
Philippides, 2015). Research on pedestrian movement demonstrates that as well as the 
influence of small group formations (Moussaïd, Perozo, Garnier, Helbing, & Theraulaz, 
2010), if people are members of psychological crowds they walk more closely to others in the 
crowd, which slows down the total walking speed for the crowd as a whole (Templeton 
Drury, & Philippides, 2018). 
Templeton et al. (2015) specify some of the psychological properties needed for agents 
in computer simulations to properly capture some basic features of crowd psychology. These 
include the ability of an individual to know their own group identity and perceive the group 
identities of others. While modellers increasingly refer to the social identity literature, few 
pedestrian models so far have implemented basic social identity principles (see von Sivers et 
al., 2016, for a notable exception). 
Mass gatherings health  
The discipline of mass gatherings medicine has, historically, tended to emphasise the 
negative effects of attendance on health -- principally via increased susceptibility to 
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infectious diseases (e.g., Memish, Stephens, Steffen, & Ahmed, 2012). The recent research 
on the crowd psychology of mass gatherings complements this by demonstrating not only 
that psychological crowd membership can have benefits for health and wellbeing (as 
described above). As a result of this, following the 3rd International Conference on Mass 
Gatherings Medicine in 2017, the whole field was renamed Mass Gatherings Health (Yezli et 
al., 2018). Indeed, a fundamental message of the psychological research is that, even if 
certain risks are increased, overall, mass gatherings have a positive health impact and should 
be encouraged as a public health intervention (Hopkins & Reicher, 2016). 
However, besides this general message, Hopkins and Reicher (2017) provide more 
detailed analysis of the ambivalent health effects of the three psychological transformations 
of crowd psychology. Thus, the cognitive transformation can, depending on the normative 
content of the relevant social identity, either lead to positive behaviours (say, abstinence from 
rich foods at the Magh Mela) or negative behaviours (substance abuse at music festivals). 
Equally, the relational transformation can alternatively lead to unsafe health practices (such 
as loss of disgust leading to sharing food and drink, hence increasing disease transmission) or 
positive practices (such as supporting people in need). And, finally, the emotional 
transformations can alternatively attenuate what might otherwise be stressors (such as loud 
noise and crowding) or lead people to expose themselves to greater risks (such as going into 
densely crowded spaces). 
In practical terms, this has important implications in terms of health promotion and 
health communication at mass gatherings. On the one hand, it is important to tailor advice to 
the particular identities of the groups involved. There is no point urging people to act in ways 
that are at odds with collective beliefs. Rather messages must be made congruent with group 
norms. So, for instance, rather than urging people not to share food (which goes against a 
communal ethos) one might stress the need to show concern for others well-being.  
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On the other hand, it is important to ensure that advice comes from, or has the 
blessing of, ingroup sources rather than outgroup experts who might be seen as having 
different values and priorities to their audience. 
Conclusions  
This chapter has covered a wide range of collective phenomena, but, for reasons of space, 
there are some we have not mentioned - including mass psychogenic illness, ‘crazes’, 
‘stampedes’, and those crowds where shoppers compete physically for bargains (during 
Black Friday and similar sales events). However, we suggest that the social identity 
framework described here provides the tools and concepts for addressing these and other 
crowd behaviours. In short, those crowds where there is competition between individuals are 
likely to be physical crowds, where there is low or no shared social identity, or where there is 
a shared norm of competition; and those crowds where there is coordination, synchrony and 
social influence and other evidence of relationality are likely to be psychological crowds 
where there is a sense of ‘we-ness’. 
 More generally, what we have sought to do in this chapter is to develop an analysis of 
the psychological consequences of we-ness and how this provides not only the inclination, 
but also the practical capability to act as social subjects - and therefore to act in ways that are 
coherent and socially meaningful. Moreover, if we complement this analysis of intra-group 
processes in the crowd with an analysis of the inter-group dynamics of crowd events, we are 
able to explain not only how crowds act to express social identities but also how social 
identities themselves can be formed and reformed in the crowd. In sum, we are able to 
explain both social determination and social change. 
 This helps us answer a final, fundamental, question. Why research the crowd? For 
many years, crowds were ignored by psychologists - as indexed by its neglect in social 
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psychology textbooks - or at most seen as a spectacular but peripheral phenomenon. The 
neglect might seem surprising to the lay person. The crowd is at the centre of social life: 
national and international events, civic celebration and major incidents, everyday experiences 
of sports, music, shopping, and travel. But it is also key to periods of fundamental social 
change. But also, as we have argued throughout this chapter, the crowd is equally relevant to 
our academic concerns. It is a place where core phenomena can be investigated and 
understood (Reicher, 2011, 2017) – identity, influence, social relations, power, emotion, 
social change. While it is sometimes relegated to the margins, we suggest that the crowd 
should be at the core of social psychology and indeed of the social sciences. 
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